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Demystifying Membership Inference Attacks in
Machine Learning as a Service
Stacey Truex, Ling Liu, Mehmet Emre Gursoy, Lei Yu, and Wenqi Wei
Abstract—Membership inference attacks seek to infer membership of individual training instances of a model to which an adversary
has black-box access through a machine learning-as-a-service API. In providing an in-depth characterization of membership privacy
risks against machine learning models, this paper presents a comprehensive study towards demystifying membership inference
attacks from two complimentary perspectives. First, we provide a generalized formulation of the development of a black-box
membership inference attack model. Second, we characterize the importance of model choice on model vulnerability through a
systematic evaluation of a variety of machine learning models and model combinations using multiple datasets. Through formal
analysis and empirical evidence from extensive experimentation, we characterize under what conditions a model may be vulnerable to
such black-box membership inference attacks. We show that membership inference vulnerability is data-driven and corresponding
attack models are largely transferable. Though different model types display different vulnerabilities to membership inference, so do
different datasets. Our empirical results additionally show that (1) using the type of target model under attack within the attack model
may not increase attack effectiveness and (2) collaborative learning exposes vulnerabilities to membership inference risks when the
adversary is a participant. We also discuss countermeasure and mitigation strategies.
Index Terms—membership inference; federated learning; data privacy
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MACHINE learning-as-a-service has seen an explosionof interest with the development of cloud platform
services. Amazon [1], Microsoft [2], IBM [3], and Google [4]
have all launched such machine learning-as-a-service plat-
forms. These services allow companies to leverage pow-
erful machine learning and artificial intelligence technolo-
gies without requiring in-house domain expertise. Machine
learning-as-a-service platforms allow users to upload their
data, run various data analytics or model building pro-
cesses, and deploy trained models to services of their own.
Given this landscape, new interest has been given to the
potential vulnerabilities of such machine learning services.
One such vulnerability is membership inference. Let us
consider a cancer treatment center with a large database
of valuable patient data. Let our cancer treatment center
then leverage a machine learning-as-a-service platform to
develop a predictive model which, when given a patient’s
data as input, can predict cancer-related health outcomes.
The treatment center then utilizes the cloud deployment
option to create a service of their own wherein users can log
in, provide their own health information, and receive pre-
dictions in return. A membership inference attack considers
a scenario wherein a user of such a black-box prediction
service is an adversary. This adversary can provide the
health information of another individual X and, based on
the model’s output, try to infer if X is a cancer patient at the
treatment center.
There are two primary parties who are interested in
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protecting against such membership inference attacks: pa-
tient X and the cancer treatment center. Previous patients
of the cancer treatment center, such as patient X , consider
their membership private and do not want their patronage
to be public knowledge. For example, consider the case
of a treatment center patient, Alice. Let Alice be under
consideration for a job at Bob’s company. Bob can leverage
the cancer treatment center’s service to infer whether or not
Alice is a patient. Upon learning of Alice’s inclusion in the
cancer treatment center’s database, Bob decides not to hire
Alice in favor of a candidate who, he believes, will have
lower healthcare costs for the company.
In addition to concerns of patients such as Alice, we also
must consider the interests of the cancer treatment center,
the owner of the training dataset and the trained model
under attack. In today’s market, across many domains, data
is considered an organizational asset [5]. While internal
data has always been a driver of decision making for most
companies, the role of data has been moving steadily closer
to the core of many industries. A company’s data therefore
holds intrinsic value to the organization. Additionally, this
training data is the source of the machine learning model
under attack. Training this model not only requires front-
end capital, time, and resources but also holds competitive
business value for the treatment center. The treatment center
may even charge a fee per evaluation. It is therefore essential
from the cancer treatment center’s perspective to protect
their private database.
Membership Inference Risks v.s. Differential Privacy.
Membership inference violates the privacy of both the indi-
vidual participants involved in the model training and the
owner of the training dataset. The former involves mem-
bership privacy of individuals who are participants in the
model training and the latter involves risks of unauthorized
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leakages of business value or trade secrets. The ultimate
goal of membership privacy is to protect against the risk
of membership leakage of individuals in the data used in
training a machine learning model.
When a model is secured by differential privacy, there
exists some formal guarantee that the model trained on
the original dataset D will produce statistically similar
predictions as a model trained on D′, which differs from
D by exactly one instance [6]. Differential privacy therefore
protects the content privacy and the output privacy of the
model, often with some cost to model accuracy. Membership
privacy refers to membership inference against machine
learning models and is centered on inferring the member-
ship of the input data, but not the content of input data,
from the output result of the model.
Membership Inference v.s. Adversarial Examples. Ad-
versarial learning to-date has been focused on attacking
deployed deep learning models. Most existing membership
inference attacks similarly attack deep learning models,
utilizing deep neural networks (DNNs) for training both the
target model under attack and the attack model [7], [8], [9],
[10]. However, membership inference attacks are different
from adversarial examples with respect to both the attack
generation process and the adverse effects of successful
attacks and therefore represent a separate class of security
and privacy intrusion problems under the general umbrella
of adversarial machine learning. Concretely, adversarial
deep learning research to date has been centered on the
generation of adversarial examples by injecting the minimal
amount of perturbation to a benign example required to
cause a pre-trained classification model to misclassify the
example with high probability. Thus, adversarial example-
based attacks aim at altering the output of the model pre-
diction without being visually noticed. On the contrary, a
membership inference attack does not alter the prediction
output at all and succeeds by simply making membership
inference on the prediction output.
Scope and Contributions of the paper. In this paper, we
investigate membership inference attacks under a black-box
access scenario in which an adversary may only probe the
prediction API with input and receive the corresponding
prediction output from the privately trained model. Our
research results are novel from three perspectives. First, we
describe a systematic approach to construct a membership
inference attack model with a general formulation of each
component of the attack model generation framework. We
show that generating a membership inference attack model
is a complex and multi-step strategic process. Second, to
understand when and how membership inference attacks
work and why certain models and datasets are more vulner-
able, we take a holistic approach with extensive empirical
evidence to study and characterize membership inference
attacks across different target model types, different types of
training datasets, and different combinations of model types
for generating attack training datasets and attack models.
Finally, we introduce and investigate a new membership
threat, insider membership inference, which is launched
by a member of a federated learning system against other
participants in an collaborative learning environment. As
federated learning systems become more popular with
promises of increased accuracy and privacy, highlighting
and understanding this risk is an important part of the
membership inference mitigation effort.
2 MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACKS
In this section, we formalize membership inference attacks
against machine learning models as follows: Given an in-
stance x and black-box access to a classification model Ft
trained on a dataset D, can an adversary infer with high
confidence that the instance x was contained in D at the
train time of Ft? This definition states that membership
inference focuses on the question of the membership of
x in D and not about the contents of x. This divergence
separates membership inference from existing areas of pri-
vacy research, such as differential privacy [11], [12], [13] or
secure multiparty computation [14], [15], [16]. Also notable
is that membership inference attacks are at the local level:
an adversary wishes to know if a particular x is in D and
not D in its entirety.
Fig. 1. The workflow of a Membership Inference Attack.
Figure 1 illustrates the workflow of membership infer-
ence attack development. Given a training dataset D and
a classification model Ft trained on D, the machine learn-
ing service provider may provide a classification service
through a prediction API. This API offers users black-box
access to the model Ft. Users may send prediction queries
with their own data to the service and receive classification
predictions. An adversary uses such a service to collect
information about the private dataset D on which the pre-
diction model Ft was privately trained. By leveraging any
public or background knowledge of the training dataset D
or the target model Ft, an adversary builds a membership
inference attack model Fa to deploy for launching member-
ship inference attacks in real time.
To gain an in-depth understanding of the general for-
mulation of the membership inference attack model, we
first characterize the types of adversarial knowledge and
datasets required to train the attack model as well as the
attack cost, the attack value, and their evaluation metrics.
We then present a systematic formulation of general attacks
in Section 3.
2.1 Threat Model and Assumptions
2.1.1 Machine Learning-As-A-Service: Black-box Access
Recall from Figure 1 that the machine learning service
provider publishes the trained target model Ft through a
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black-box access API, which accepts service requests from
users in the form of a prediction query for input x and
returns the predicted class and the prediction probability
vector. The input and output formats of the API are given
by the service provider as part of a service agreement.
However, Ft and the dataset D on which Ft is trained
remain private. Only the prediction API is exposed to users,
thus ensuring only black-box access to Ft.
A question one may ask is: “How can an adversary with
only black-box access to the prediction API perform mem-
bership inference attack without knowing anything about Ft
and the dataset D?” Generally speaking, Ft is trained as an
approximation of an ideal function y = Γ(x) for a training
dataset D, where y is the true class for the sample instance
x ∈ D. Let yc denote the output of a candidate model
Fc. An optimal model is then the one that minimizes the
average loss defined by a chosen loss function L(y, yc) for
all samples in the training set D, weighted by their posterior
probability. The posterior probability, Py(yc|x), is defined
as the probability of class yc being the label of sample x.
For many application specific problems, y = Γ(x) is a non-
deterministic function. That is, if x is sampled repeatedly,
different values of y may be given. In this case, the optimal
choice of the class for sample object x among all candidate
class labels is the class that minimizes the expected loss for
a given sample x. The target model Ft is then assigned to
be the optimal model for the training dataset D upon the
completion of the training and testing phases.
There are currently a multitude of well-studied algo-
rithms available to determine Ft. Without loss of generality
to which algorithm or loss function was chosen to identify
Ft, we simply maintain that Ft is a function which maps
feature vectors x ∈ Rm to a class y ∈ Zk, k ≥ 2. Our
target function therefore creates a decision boundary which
separates the feature space Rm into k sets in which each set
is associated with a candidate class value in Zk. As these
sets and corresponding class assignments are chosen to
minimize the loss function L(y, yc) over the training dataset
D, the decision boundaries are strongly informed by the
training dataset D and will in turn be the core of the trained
machine learning model Ft.
2.1.2 Adversarial Knowledge
We characterize the membership inference threat model
based on prior adversarial knowledge. We broadly catego-
rize this adversarial knowledge into three categories: black-
box, grey-box, and white-box data knowledge.
Black-Box Knowledge. An adversary is said to have
black-box knowledge when the adversary does not have
any specialized knowledge of the training data. However,
black-box knowledge may include the input and output of
the service API as well as publicly available information
about the target prediction model Ft. For example, if the
service provider is our cancer treatment center, then the ad-
versary may have access to relevant statistics curated by the
government and published for the public good including
demographic information, such as the likeliness of different
age groups or genders to contract certain cancers, or clinical
information, such as the prevalence of co-occurrence of
different diseases with various cancer types.
Grey-Box Knowledge. We characterize grey-box knowl-
edge as specialized population-level knowledge. This may
include population-level statistics that describe the distri-
bution of features in the target model’s training data. For
example, in addition to publicly available distributions on
the average age of cancer patients (black-box knowledge),
the adversary may know the average age of a cancer patient
seen at the target treatment center (specific knowledge).
White-Box Knowledge. White-box knowledge charac-
terizes scenarios where the training data for Ft is sampled
from a constrained population or in a skewed fashion such
that an adversary has access to some versions of real data
in the training data D of the target model Ft or some
leaked portion of D but not the complete training set D. For
example, a noisy version of the real data may be accessible
which resembles D with the addition of some noise or
missing values [7]. Adversaries with white-box knowledge
can therefore develop or access true “in” samples and
employ active learning techniques on these known samples
to develop a very accurate dataset to mirror D.
Adversaries with white-box knowledge are the most
powerful whereas adversaries with only black-box knowl-
edge represent the most difficult attack environment
wherein adversaries are limited to (i) publicly availbale
information, (ii) black-box queries to the prediction API,
and (iii) the output of classification prediction from the
target model Ft. This is the setting we use to formulate
membership inference attacks and to characterize adverse
effects and divergence of membership inferences.
2.2 Attack Value vs. Attack Cost
It is generally accepted that systems security should never
operate as an all-or-nothing mechanism. Systems must al-
ways seek to optimize two sets of factors: cost of defense
vs value of assets to the system owner and cost of attack vs
value of assets to the adversary. These principles hold true
to deployed learning systems with respect to membership
inference attacks.
In the context of membership inference attacks, value
can be characterized by attack accuracy as an evaluation of
what level of leakage is present in Ft or what amount of
knowledge an attacker can expect to gain. The cost of attack
refers to the knowledge and work necessary for an ad-
versary to launch a successful attack. When characterizing
cost, we consider knowledge cost as well as development
cost. For example, to launch an effective attack, how much
knowledge of D or Ft does an adversary need? Gaining
this knowledge should be considered a type of cost for the
adversary. Alternatively, cost can also be characterized by
how computationally expensive it is to develop an effective
attack model Fa.
The accuracy of an attack can be characterized by a
number of metrics. For example, an accuracy measure may
be defined as the likelihood that Fa correctly identifies
x ∈ D or x /∈ D. Alternatively, accuracy can be defined as
a precision measure which indicates the fraction of the in-
stances inferred as members that are indeed members of the
training datasetD, focusing on the probability Pr[x ∈ D|Fa
says x ∈ D].
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3 GENERAL ATTACK FORMULATION
Fig. 2. Membership Attack Model Development.
Using correct identification to denote attack accuracy,
the problem of membership inference is defined as follows:
given a query input x and black-box access to the target
model Ft, the membership inference attack answers the
question of whether x ∈ D is true or false. The attack is suc-
cessful if the attacker can determine with high confidence
that x ∈ D is true or with high confidence that x /∈ D.
At the most abstract level, membership inference attack
models are binary classifiers. Given an instance x and a
target model Ft, the goal of a membership inference attack
model is to identify whether or not x was contained within
the dataset D used to train Ft.
Let D consist of n training instances
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xn, yn) where xi consists of m
features, denoted by xi = (xi,1, xi,2, ..., xi,m), and yi ∈ Zk,
where k is a finite integer value ≥ 2. Let Ft : Rm → Rk
be the target model trained using this dataset D. Given
a particular feature vector x ∈ Rm, Ft will then output a
probability vector p ∈ Rk of the form p = (p1, p2, ..., pk),
where pi ∈ [0, 1]∀i, and
∑k
i=1 pi = 1. The prediction class
label y for a feature vector x is the class with highest
probability value in p. Therefore y = arg maxi∈Zk Ft(x).
Given the adversary’s black-box access to Ft via the
prediction service API, an adversary is able to query Ft with
any number of instances to receive corresponding probabil-
ity vectors. The adversary uses this probing access, along
with any prior knowledge, to generate I , a representation
of adversarial knowledge of D. The first building block for
implementing a black-box membership inference attack is
to leverage I to generate a synthetic labeled dataset D′ to
mirror the data in D. This synthetic, labeled dataset D′
is artificially simulated and called a shadow dataset of D.
Although the word “shadow” was borrowed from shadow
copying for systems creating back up data copies [17], the
shadow dataset in our context should be thought of as
a synthetic version of the real training dataset D. D′ is
then used to generate an attack training dataset D∗, which
is required to train the final membership attack model, a
binary classifier Fa.
Figure 2 highlights these three primary phases in the
development of the membership inference attack: (1) de-
velopment of a shadow dataset, (2) generation of an attack
model training dataset, and (3) training and deployment of
the membership inference attack model. In phase (1) the
attacker’s goal is to develop a dataset denoted as D′ which
closely emulates, or shadows, the dataset D which was used
to train the target model. In phase (2) the attacker uses
this shadow dataset to develop a shadow model which is
considered to emulate the behavior of the target model.
The attacker may then observe the behavior of this shadow
model in response to instances which the attacker knows
were given during training versus those that were not. This
behavior is used to develop an attack dataset which captures
the difference between output for instances in the training
data and those previously unseen by the model. Finally,
in phase (3), this attack data is used to generate a binary
classifier which provides predictions on whether an instance
was previously known to a model based on that model’s
output from that instance. We now discuss each of these
phases in further detail.
3.1 Development of a Shadow Dataset
Fig. 3. Development of a Shadow Dataset.
Given a target model Ft, its training dataset D, and
black-box adversarial knowledge , the development of a
shadow dataset D′ is the first step in generating a mem-
bership inference attack model. D′ consists of n′ training
instances (x′1, y′1), (x
′
2, y
′
2), ..., (x
′
n′ , y
′
n′) where each x
′
i con-
sists of m features equivalent to those in D and each y′i is
a predicted class label in Zk. Note that k and m are known
via the service API and thus consistent acrossD andD′. The
cardinality of D, however, remains unknown and therefore
n and n′ are likely to differ. The shadow dataset generation
process leverages the prediction service API to manage the
creation and control the quality of D′, as shown in Figure 3.
3.1.1 API Probing
While the training set D and the cardinality (size) n of D
are unknown to an adversary, the adversary can probe the
service API to reveal structural information, such as the
number of features m, the data types of those features, and
the number of classes k. This knowledge can be obtained by
the adversary through sending in trial query instances and
observing responses.
We refer to the complete set of adversarial knowledge
as I . This includes prior knowledge as well as that inferred
from this API probing. We do not state any limitations on
I except that D 6⊂ I , as the membership inference attack
becomes trivial when D ⊂ I . The cost of launching an
effective membership inference attack includes the work of
this probing phase by the adversary.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SERVICES COMPUTING, VOL. X, NO. Y, MONTH 20XX 5
As a result of this API probing, the adversary can
construct a skeleton dataset D′, which is similar to D in
structure and, ideally, any x′ ∈ D′ should be a viable
instance that could be included in D.
3.1.2 Shadow Data Generation
There are several ways to generate a quality shadow dataset
with a small number of query probing attempts. Below
we highlight four categories of techniques: statistics-based,
active learning-based, query-based, and region-based gen-
eration.
Statistics-Based Generation. In statistics-based genera-
tion, the adversary leverages population-level statistics of
the features in D to create samples for D′. Given known
distributions for features, an adversary may conduct ran-
dom sampling to construct these new samples. Features may
be treated independently where an instance is generated
through m + 1 random samplings of m + 1 distributions,
each distribution corresponding to either a different feature
or the class label. Alternatively, sampling may account for
feature relationships. This may be done, for example, when
our adversary has knowledge of statistics on disease co-
occurrence.
Active Learning-Based Generation. Active learning is a
technique developed in the semi-supervised machine learn-
ing domain [18]. Active learning has been developed to
address the problem of a largely unlabeled training dataset
when assigning accurate labels is an expensive task. For
example, in the development of a spam filter one may have
access to a large number of unlabeled emails [19]. It is
a very expensive proposal to suggest that a human read
millions of emails to provide labels, yet labels are neces-
sary to develop an accurate filter. To address this problem,
representative samples are selected and labeled. Given this
subset of training instances which now have accurate labels,
an automated process takes over and propagates the label
logic to other instances. Active learning techniques may be
combined with statistics-based generation in black-box or
grey-box data knowledge scenarios where a large number
of samples may be generated through random sampling of
the features but class labels assigned through intervention
by the adversary followed by active learning.
Query-Based Generation. When using query-based gen-
eration, an adversary will generate a random sample and
then query the target model. The target model will then
provide a probability vector output. In this case the adver-
sary will want to identify instances for which the machine
learning service provides a class label with relatively high
confidence. That is, the adversary will search for instances
in which the output p has a max(p) value above some pre-
defined threshold. This, again, may be combined with other
techniques. For example, query-based generation may be
used to provide a seed for active learning or statistics-based
generation may inform the development of the instances
sent to the service provider.
Region-Based Generation. Region-based generation fol-
lows a clustering-based logic. Given an instance x with label
y, region-based generation will seek to generate instances x′
where dist(x,x′) is below some pre-determined threshold
for a pre-chosen distance function dist. The new instance
x′ is then assigned the same label y. One way an ad-
versary may use region-based generation is in conjunction
with white-box data knowledge. Given knowledge of some
instances either in D or very similar to those in D an
adversary can use region-based generation to expand this
knowledge into a larger number of highly accurate instances
to construct D′.
Several factors may determine which concrete technique
will be chosen by an adversary, such as the knowledge
contained in I or the query probing results. For example,
an adversary who has grey-box data knowledge may be
more likely to rely on statistics-based generation due to
the specificity of the available statistics to D whereas an
adversary with black-box knowledge may want to augment
statistics-based generation with query-based generation due
to lower confidence in their non-specific, population-level
knowledge of D. On the other hand, active learning-based
or region-based generation would likely be a popular choice
for adversaries with white-box data knowledge where the
adversary may leverage their insider knowledge ofD. These
are just some of the considerations in the development of an
effective membership inference attack model.
Fig. 4. Shadow dataset development using query-based and region-
based techniques with black-box data knowledge. Figures adapted from
images in [20] and [21]
In Figure 4 we show an example of the shadow dataset
development process using a combination of query-based
and region-based techniques for an adversary with black-
box data knowledge. The adversary first randomly gener-
ates a starting point ds using distributions in I . This point
ds is then queried to the service provider which provides
pds in return. The point ds is then updated randomly and
queried again. This is continued until a confidence threshold
or stopping condition is reached. That is, the process stops
when either (1) a point df is found such that max(pdf )
meets a predefined confidence threshold or (2) the point has
been updated and queried without meeting the confidence
threshold the maximum number of times as determined by
the attacker. If condition (2) is met a new ds is chosen until
the process results in condition (1) and an accepted point
df .
A hyper-cube is then constructed surrounding df . A
set of new samples {d1f , d2f , d3f , ...} are then generated by
randomly sampling from the hyper-cube region. Each point
dif is assigned the class arg maxi∈Zk pdf and added, along
with df to the shadow dataset D′. The entire process is then
repeated beginning with sampling a new starting point from
I and ending with a new set of samples added to D′. The
adversary will continue this repetition until a satisfactory
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number of samples n′ have been added to D′.
3.2 Generation of an Attack Model Training Set
Fig. 5. Generation of an Attack Model Training Set.
Upon the completion of the development of the shadow
dataset D′, the adversary will proceed to utilize the shadow
dataset D′ to develop the membership attack dataset for
training a binary classifier as the final attack model, as
shown in Figure 5. Given that each instance in D′ consists of
a feature-vector and its known-class, denoted by (x′, y′), the
adversary can define an attack generation function denoted
by Fg : (Rm,Zk) → (Rk,Z2). Fg takes a feature vector-
known class pair (x′, y′) as input and outputs an attack
training instance, consisting of two pieces of information: a
probability vector p = (p1, p2, ..., pk) and a binary class la-
bel, indicating “in” or “out”. There are several approaches
to generate Fg using D′. For example, the adversary can
train a new model over D′ which simulates the private
target model Ft. In this case, we call Fg a shadow model
of Ft. Given that the adversary does not know the orig-
inal training set D nor the size of D, the adversary may
leverage ensemble learning techniques [22], such as data
partition-based ensembles, model-based ensembles, or hy-
brid ensemble models, to improve the quality of the shadow
model with the goal of accurately simulating the target
model Ft. The attack model training set generation function
Fg : (Rm,Zk) → (Rk,Z2) can therefore be viewed as an
ensemble of a set of shadow models. These shadow models
seek to characterize the decision boundary of the target model.
More specifically, the shadow models aim at mirroring the
sensitivity of the target decision boundary to individual
instances.
Consider a data partition based ensemble approach [7].
The adversary partitions the shadow dataset D′ into D′train
and D′test. D
′
train is then divided into q partitions (q > 1),
one partition for each shadow model. Each partition of
D′train will then be used to train a single shadow model Fgi .
Here we intentionally do not specify the machine learning
model type of Fgi as this is yet another design choice
made by an adversary. The decision may be informed if
the adversary knows the model type of Ft or chosen using
some other criteria, we leave this decision unspecified to
remove the constraint that an adversary must know the
model type of Ft. Next, D′test will be evaluated against Fgi .
The corresponding outputs will then be labeled as “out”.
Additionally, a sample of size |D′test| is taken from the
D′train partition used to train Fgi and evaluated against
Fgi with the corresponding outputs labeled as “in”. By
combining these output-label pairs, we obtain the attack
train data D∗.
Figure 5 highlights the workflow of generating an attack
model training set. An adversary may choose a single model
for efficiency or an ensemble of models to increase the size
or generality of D∗. An adversary may diversify model
types in an ensemble when Ft’s type is unknown. If an
ensemble is used, there are choices on size, sampling, and
aggregation that must be made and can be informed by the
adversary’s knowledge of the target in various ways. We
stress that while we formulate the membership inference
attack using a general model, there exist many implementa-
tion variants.
Effect of Ensemble Methods. Combining multiple dif-
ferent models reduces the risk of choosing the wrong hy-
pothesis within the hypothesis space of a particular prob-
lem. Also, multiple models allows for more effective local
search, which many machine learning algorithms perform
in various ways, and limits the impact of the local optima
problem. Finally, a combining of chosen hypotheses allows
for an expansion of the hypothesis space [22]. Two common
ways to accomplish this diversity are bagging and boosting.
Bagging is accomplished by either drawing a sample of
training examples from the original dataset randomly and
with replacement, or by creating disjoint subsets of the orig-
inal training data called cross-validated committees [23]. A
commonly used implementation of bagging is the Random
Forest ensemble model [24].
Using the boosting technique, a set of weights is main-
tained for each instance within the training dataset. Each
model is then trained iteratively to minimize the weighted
error of the training dataset. The weights of the training
instances are updated to put more emphasis on the mis-
classified examples. The adaboost ensemble model [25] is a
popular implementation of boosting.
The use of multiple models via ensemble learning for
attack data generation decreases the risk of choosing the
wrong hypothesis. Given an adversary who has only black-
box knowledge of the target model (regardless of the adver-
sary’s knowledge type of the dataset D), there is no guaran-
teed method to reproducing the target model’s behavior on
D. A diversity of generation models will minimize the risk
that the adversary is only capturing one behavior type or
candidate decision boundary shape. This again accentuates
the need for boosting or bagging to ensure that the model
set is diverse.
3.3 Generating the Membership Attack Model
The attack model training set D∗ contains the outputs
from the generation function Fg : (Rm,Zk) → (Rk,Z2).
D∗ consists of n∗ instances, (x∗1, y
∗
1), (x
∗
2, y
∗
2), ..., (x
∗
n∗ , y
∗
n∗),
and each instance is the output of Fg for some input
(x′, y′) ∈ (Rm,Zk). This attack model training dataset
D∗ will then be used to generate the final attack model
Fa : Rk → {in,out}, which takes as input a probability
vector output for an instance x and outputs a binary classifi-
cation of “in” or“out”. Similarly, we make no assumptions
on how D∗ is used to inform Fa but rather say that D∗
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Fig. 6. Training and Deployment of the Membership Inference Attack
Model
is available to an adversary during the generation of the
membership attack model Fa. A number of machine learn-
ing models and techniques can be leveraged to train a binary
classification-based attack model Fa using D∗. Fa can then
be deployed against the output of the target model Ft such
that, ideally, given an instance x, Fa(Ft(x)) = “in” if the
instance x ∈ D and Fa(Ft(x)) = “out” if x /∈ D. Figure
6 visualizes this final phase of developing a membership
inference attack.
Regardless of how complex the chosen training process
is, whether it is a distance evaluation or a complex machine
learning model, this phase produces the final attack model
Fa which will be deployed for membership inference attack
against D in real time.
4 GENERAL ATTACK CHARACTERIZATION
We have thus far provided a general formulation of mem-
bership inference attacks. In this section, we characterize
such attacks through a systematic evaluation of a variety
of machine learning models and model combinations using
multiple datasets. We show that membership inference vul-
nerability is data-driven and its attack models are largely
transferable. Although the target model is a dominating
factor in determining vulnerability, attack data generation
techniques need not explicitly mirror the target model.
Finally, we show that membership inference attacks can
persist as insider attacks in federated systems.
4.1 Experimental Setup
We conduct a series of experiments to support our charac-
terization of membership inference attacks. In this section
we report empirical evidence for four types of machine
learning models (logistic regression, k-nearest neighbor, de-
cision tree, and Naı¨ve Bayes). A total of seven datasets
are used in these experiments: Adult, MNIST, CIFAR-10,
Purchases-10, Purchases-20, Purchases-50, and Purchases-
100. Our experiments were conducted using Python [26]
and algorithms available with scikit-learn [20]. All reported
results are averaged across 10 runs each using 10-fold cross-
validation.
In reporting our results we use the accuracy metric.
This is to capture the attacker’s ability to both identify
when x ∈ D and x /∈ D. Previous work, namely [7],
report the precision metric which captures an attacker’s
ability to correctly identify when x ∈ D only. We therefore
include this metric in Table 5 to compare the authors’
neural network results with those from our experiments
with logistic regression, k-nearest neighbor, decision tree,
and Naı¨ve Bayes models. Precision is also reported, along
side accuracy, in Table 8 to aide in the comparison between
insider and outsider attacks. All other results report the
accuracy metric.
4.1.1 Datasets
4.1.1.1 Adult: The Adult dataset is available on the
UCI Machine Learning Repository [27] and contains 48,842
instances described by 14 different features. The feature set
contains both continuous (ex: age, hours per week) and
discrete (ex: education, marital status) values. This dataset
presents a binary classification problem wherein one wishes
to identify if an individual makes ≥ $50K or < $50K in
yearly salary.
4.1.1.2 MNIST: MNIST is a publicly available
dataset containing 70,000 images of handwritten digits [28].
Each image is formatted to be 32 x 32 and processed such
that the digit is at the center of the image. The MNIST
dataset constitutes a 10-class classification problem where
the task is to identify which digit between 0 and 9, inclusive,
is contained within a given image.
4.1.1.3 CIFAR-10: The CIFAR-10 dataset, also pub-
licly available, contains 60,000 color images [29]. Again, each
image is formatted to be 32 x 32. The CIFAR-10 dataset also
has 10 classes: airplane, automobile, bird, cat, deer, dog,
frog, horse, ship and truck. Each class has 6,000 available
images. The problem is therefore a 10-class classification
problem where the task is to identify which of the 10 classes
is depicted in a given image.
4.1.1.4 Purchases: Finally, we developed a number
of purchases datasets similar to what was done in [7].
The purchases datasets were developed from the Kaggle
Acquire Valued Shoppers Challenge dataset which contains
the shopping history of several thousand individuals. From
this dataset we create new datasets wherein each instance
represents an individual and each feature represents a par-
ticular product. If an individual has purchased this product,
there will be a 1 for the feature and otherwise a 0. The
instances are then clustered into different shopping profile
types. These cluster assignments are treated as the classes.
We created different datasets with 10, 20, 50, and 100 shop-
ping profile types. The classification problem then becomes:
given a shopper’s purchase history, identify their shopping
profile type.
We highlight these datasets as each shows fundamen-
tally different results in previous work and the makeup
of each is significantly different. For example, the Adult
dataset presents a binary classification problem with nu-
meric and factor features and was demonstrated to be
resilient to membership inference attacks in previous
work with precision results of 50.3%. By comparison, the
Purchases-50 dataset has 50 different class values, only
binary features, and was much more vulnerable to attack
in previous work, with precision results of 86.0% [7].
4.2 Membership Inference: Data-Driven
Recall Section 3. There are many choices an adversary can
make during the three phases of developing the member-
ship inference attack model, each of which may impact the
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model accuracy and consequently the attack success rate.
Two elements that the adversary cannot control, however,
are the training dataset D and the target model Ft. Our
experimental results show that membership inference at-
tacks are data-driven. That is, the make-up of D strongly
correlates with the corresponding target model Ft’s vulner-
ability to membership inference attacks. Potential targets of
such attacks can therefore use knowledge of their data to
evaluate their risk. Table 1 compares the seven different
datasets measuring three characteristics: (1) feature distri-
bution, (2) number of classes (size of k), and (3) accuracy of
(vulnerability to) membership inference.
Dataset In-Class Standard Deviation Number of Classes Accuracy of
Membership Inference
Adult 0.1433 2 59.89
MNIST 0.1586 10 61.75
CIFAR-10 0.2301 10 90.44
Purchases-10 0.3820 10 82.29
Purchases-20 0.3873 20 88.98
Purchases-50 0.3873 50 93.71
Purchases-100 0.3832 100 95.74
TABLE 1
Comparison of datasets versus membership inference attack
accuracy using a decision tree model.
The number of classes is important as it characterizes the
number of regions into which the input space Rm is divided.
The more classes, the smaller each region. With smaller re-
gions, there is less uninformed space and in fact the regions
will more tightly surround the provided training instances
in D. This will make any single instance more likely to alter
the decision boundary as space is “tighter” between the
regions. If an instance is more likely to impact the decision
boundary of the target model, then an adversary will be
more likely to infer its inclusion in the training dataset.
Another side of this same argument can be seen in
the in-class standard deviation metric. This value captures
feature distributions by addressing the following: within a
dataset, given all instances of the same class, how similar
are the feature vectors? The Adult and MNIST datasets,
for example, have significantly lower standard deviations
than the Purchases datasets despite having more instances
of each class. This demonstrates more uniformity within
classes of the Adult and MNIST datasets as compared to
the Purchases datasets. If an instance is exceedingly similar
to other instances of the same class then it will be less likely
to noticeably impact the decision boundary during training.
If, however, instances within a class are notably different,
then the inclusion of each instance may significantly impact
the decision boundary. Therefore, the uniformity of the
target training data within each class will, in addition to the
number of classes, impact an adversary’s ability to identify
the inclusion of a particular instance.
The variation in attack accuracy results reported in Table
1 from experiments using the same attack development
process targeting decision tree models trained on each of
the seven datasets demonstrates that factors in the dataset
such as the in-class standard deviation and the number of
classes contribute to a model’s susceptibility to membership
inference. We make two interesting observations. First, the
impact of in-class standard deviation varies for different
types of datasets and different scales of k-class classification
problems. Second, membership inference vulnerability is
related to a number of factors, many of which are tied
to the dataset itself. Concretely, for image datasets the in-
class standard deviation increases as the complexity of the
dataset increases. For example, MNIST represents images
of grey scale for 10 single digits and CIFAR-10 represents
color images of 10 different complex entities ranging from
flowers to animals. It is observed that the attacks have
higher success rate for more complex images which also
show larger in-class SD. On the other hand, consider the
Purchase datasets where the value of k varies from 2 to
10, 20, 50 and, finally, 100. The attack accuracy increases
as k increases without the standard deviation increasing.
This shows, from a different perspective, that attack ac-
curacy is higher for more complex classification problems.
For example, consider the Purchases-50 and Purchases-100
datasets. The increase in attack accuracy demonstrates that
in-class standard deviation may not always be a dominant
factor in membership inference vulnerability, other data-
driven factors, such as the complexity of the classification
problem and the complexity of the dataset itself, can also be
important factors in membership inference vulnerability.
Table 1 shows more explicitly the impact on the attack ac-
curacy of two parameters: the variation of in-class standard
deviation and the parameter k for the k-class classification
problem. While we want to highlight the impact of these
important parameters, neither the in-class standard devia-
tion nor the value of k is the sole dominating factor. Rather,
the results in Table 1 demonstrate that the membership
inference vulnerability is not isolated to the learning process
itself but also highly related to several attributes of the
training dataset. This leads us to characterize membership
inference attacks as data-driven.
4.3 Transferable Attack Models
Recent studies on adversarial machine learning attacks such
as evasion attacks or poisoning attacks [30], [31], [32], [33]
have shown that maliciously generated adversarial exam-
ples tend to transfer from one model to another. This is
an important property as it opens the door to adversaries
in the black-box scenario. That is, an adversary need not
know details of their target model to launch a successful
attack. Through extensive experiments, we observe that
membership inference attacks are similarly transferable.
For example, the results in Table 2 are the accuracy
of membership inference attacks using various attack con-
figurations against a decision tree model trained on the
Purchases-20 dataset. The relative consistency seen in Table
2 demonstrates that many attack configurations are viable.
An adversary does not need to know the target model
configuration to launch an effective attack. This suggests
that membership inference attack models are transferable
from one target model to another, provided that targets are
trained on the same dataset D.
Next, we evaluate the standard deviation of membership
inference attack results for a membership inference attack
model Fa learned over the output of an attack data genera-
tion model Fg and deployed against a target model Ft across
the seven datasets for the following three scenarios: (1) vary
the model types for Fg and Fa while keeping Ft consistent,
(2) varying Ft and Fa while keeping Fg consistent, and (3)
varying Ft and Fg while keeping Fa consistent.
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Purchases-20 Attack Data Generation Model
Attack Model DT k-NN LR NB
DT 88.98 87.49 72.08 81.84
k-NN 88.23 72.57 84.75 74.27
LR 89.02 88.11 88.99 83.57
NB 88.96 78.60 89.05 66.34
TABLE 2
Accuracy of membership inference attack against a decision
tree target model trained on the Purchases-20 dataset.
Table 3 shows the results of the experiments on various
combinations of model types for the CIFAR-10 dataset. We
calculate the average standard deviation for scenario (1) as
follows:DTsd denotes the standard deviation of all accuracy
values in rows 1, 5, 9, and 13 where the target model is a
decision tree (DT). Similarly, k-NNsd corresponds to rows 2,
6, 10, and 14, LRsd with 3, 7, 11, and 15, and NBsd with 4, 8,
12, and 16. Then we consider the average standard deviation
in accuracy for scenario (1) to be the average of DTsd, k-
NNsd, LRsd, NBst. For scenario (3) we follow a similar
process but with row sets 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, and 13-16. Scenario
(2) is calculated by averaging the standard deviations for
each of the 4 Fg columns.
Attack Model Target Model Attack Data Generation ModelDT k-NN LR NB
DT
DT 90.44% 85.64% 60.48% 65.78%
k-NN 54.92% 69.32% 55.01% 51.38%
LR 53.84% 61.06% 61.10% 50.02%
NB 50.46% 50.58% 49.98% 50.20%
k-NN
DT 89.96% 81.55% 89.07% 61.10%
k-NN 55.33% 68.32% 62.45% 50.89%
LR 51.34% 59.58% 64.78% 50.09%
NB 50.12% 50.61% 50.46% 50.11%
LR
DT 90.37% 90.11% 88.81% 66.98%
k-NN 51.72% 69.90% 65.29% 55.64%
LR 50.01% 64.34% 67.40% 54.49%
NB 50.54% 50.63% 50.60% 50.29%
NB
DT 90.42% 89.86% 90.52% 63.71%
k-NN 50.33% 68.31% 57.65% 53.08%
LR 50.00% 64.22% 67.63% 53.54%
NB 50.58% 50.44% 50.58% 50.01%
TABLE 3
Accuracy for CIFAR-10 dataset across experiments with
various attack, data generation, and target models.
We follow this process for each of the seven datasets and
summarize the results in Table 4. This allows us to compare
the impact of model variation for each Ft, Fg , and Fa. We
observe that the standard deviation of membership infer-
ence attack results is relatively small against a fixed target
model when compared to a fixed attack data generation
model or fixed attack model. A smaller standard deviation
is indicative of a larger impact. That is, the accuracy is stable
when the standard deviation is small. A small standard
deviation would indicate that the fixed model has more
influence over attack accuracy than the varied models.
Table 4 clearly shows that for all datasets the deviation
is minimized when Ft is fixed. This indicates that variation
in Fg and Fa have a comparatively low impact on attack
success rates. This supports the evidence in Table 2 that an
adversary need not have particularly informed choices in Fg
or Fa to develop an attack model. We therefore characterize
membership inference attacks, like others in the adversarial
learning domain, as transferable.
Dataset Standard Deviation in Accuracy ResultsFixed Ft Fixed Fg Fixed Fa
Adult 0.0093 0.0335 0.0328
MNIST 0.0126 0.0347 0.0351
CIFAR-10 0.0643 0.1233 0.1366
Purchases-10 0.0396 0.1069 0.1074
Purchases-20 0.0545 0.1336 0.1352
Purchases-50 0.0705 0.1468 0.1482
Purchases-100 0.0849 0.1468 0.1452
TABLE 4
Standard deviation between accuracy results with (1) fixed Ft
type and varying Fg and Fa types, (2) fixed Fg type and varying
Ft and Fa types, and (3) fixed Fa type and varying Ft and Fg
types.
In summary, Table 2 highlights the role of the attack
data generation model using the Purchases-20 dataset. It
articulates that a variety of attack model structures may
be used against a single target model. Tables 3 and 4
cover combinations of target models, attack models, and
attack data generation models with the CIFAR-10 dataset
to illustrate a broader, more comprehensive picture that
both the target model and the target dataset are the most
important factors for membership inference vulnerability.
For each of the four attack models (DT, k-NN, LR, NB), the
results show the impact in varying target models on attack
accuracy under one of the four given attack data generation
models. Table 4 shows the derivation of accuracy results
for each of the seven datasets under a fixed target, a fixed
generation model, or a fixed attack model. These results
indicate that an adversary may be able to develop an attack
model without knowing “best attack model or the “best
attack data generation model. To further understand this
observation, we next study the impact of different choices
of attack model on attack accuracy.
4.4 Attacks Across Model Types
Many works in adversarial machine learning focus on
the vulnerability of deep learning models whose uses
range from image classification [34], [35] to speech recog-
nition [36], [37] to natural language processing [38]. By
generating adversarial examples which are tweaked in ways
that are unnoticeable to humans, adversaries can exploit
the models’ complexities to force misclassification [39], [40].
This trend has also influenced the study of membership
inference problems.
Most existing efforts on membership infer-
ence [8], [9], [10], [7] have been focused on deep learning
models. We argue that the complexity exploited in
traditional adversarial learning attacks is not explicitly
leveraged in membership inference attacks. Additionally,
areas where membership inference would be most
alarming, such as healthcare [41], e-commerce, banking,
and government often deploy simpler model types, such
as decision trees as model understanding is prioritized
for safe use of predictive services. This leads to a natural
question: are model types outside of deep learning
methods susceptible to membership inference? Our
empirical study on all seven datasets and four types of
models demonstrates that not only are other model types
vulnerable to membership inference attacks but that the
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model type is in fact very influential in determining the
extent of that vulnerability.
The basic hypothesis of membership inference attack is
it that models respond differently to instances which they
have “seen” versus those they have not. In this hypothesis
it is clear that model behavior and sensitivity are likely
to impact vulnerability. We therefore consider a variety
of model types outside of neural networks. We consider
models from 4 different major categories: linear models
(logistic regression), Bayesian models (Naı¨ve Bayes), cluster
models (k-nearest neighbor with k=5), and tree models
(CART decision trees).
For equal comparison to the previous work in [7], we
use the shadow model implementation of the membership
inference attack. All results from our experiments use 10-
fold cross-validation and are averaged across 10 runs for a
randomly selected sample of 10,000 instances.
Dataset LR k-NN DT NB NN
Adult 50.13 51.39 55.49 50.22 50.30
MNIST 53.25 50.44 56.66 50.48 51.70
CIFAR-10 70.25 65.99 83.94 50.03 78.00
Purchases-10 64.56 53.53 73.85 50.61 55.00
Purchases-20 75.85 55.36 81.94 50.79 59.00
Purchases-50 81.61 58.19 88.88 52.08 86.00
Purchases-100 83.78 60.11 92.19 54.93 93.50
TABLE 5
Precision of membership inference attack across 5 model
types.
Dataset LR k-NN DT NB
Adult 50.17 51.22 59.89 50.18
MNIST 54.38 50.59 61.75 50.81
CIFAR-10 67.40 68.32 90.37 50.01
Purchases-10 66.82 53.78 82.29 51.00
Purchases-20 80.50 55.92 88.98 51.29
Purchases-50 88.60 59.57 93.71 53.49
Purchases-100 90.23 62.19 95.74 57.61
TABLE 6
Accuracy of membership inference attack across 4 model
types.
We can clearly see in Table 5 that other models are in
fact vulnerable to membership inference and that both the
training data (as discussed in Section 4.2) and the model
type play an important role in understanding a particular
model’s risk. As shown in Table 5, despite the variety in our
datasets, the highest precision is seen with the decision tree
model for all datasets except Purchases-100 while the Naı¨ve
Bayes models consistently show exceedingly low precision
across all datasets.
In general, a target model whose decision boundary is
unlikely to be drastically impacted by a particular instance
will be more resilient to membership inference attacks. For
example, the Naı¨ve Bayes algorithm independently consid-
ers the probability of a given class for each feature. There-
fore, given significant training samples, a single instance
only marginally affects these probabilities. This explains the
low numbers continuously seen when attacking a Naı¨ve
Bayes model. By contrast, a decision tree leaf node will
consider a unique feature combination to determine class
rather than each feature in isolation. The introduction of a
single instance, if that instance displays a unique feature
set-class combination, may cause a decision tree to grow
and entire new branch. This sensitivity to single instances
makes membership inference attacks more successful when
targeting decision tree models.
Consequently, it is important to understand that while
different datasets display different vulnerabilities to mem-
bership inference, so do different model types. This also
indicates that machine learning-as-a-service providers who
are wary of membership inference attacks against their
deployed models may also be able to use model choice to
help mitigate vulnerability.
We have studied the impact of various target models on
attack accuracy (Section 3.3) and the impact of various attack
models on attack accuracy (Section 4.4), we next study the
impact of the attack generation models on the accuracy of
the membership inference attack.
4.5 Variation in Generation Model
Instinctually, one may believe that the model used to gen-
erate attack data must be of the same type as the target
model. We briefly discuss why previous research has made
this same assumption and then investigate its veracity and
seek to explain why it does not strictly hold.
In [7], the authors claim that the shadow model imple-
mentation of a membership inference attack requires the
shadow models be trained in a similar way to the target
model, an assumption followed by later work such as [42].
Consistent with our formalization of membership inference
attacks, this claim is equivalent to saying that the attack
data generation technique Fg must mirror the behavior of
the target model Ft under attack.
The reasoning behind this assumption is intuitive. Let
us say the target model Ft is an approximation of an ideal
function Γ for a dataset D. Then, given a data point x for
which the adversary aims to identify membership in the
training data D, the output provided to the adversary will
be Ft(x). This output will then be provided to the attack
model to determine classification of x as “in” or “out”.
Let the binary classifier which serves as the attack model be
trained from the output of a generation model Fg . That is,
the output Fg(x′) for all x′ ∈ D′ make up the attack model
training data D∗.
We can clearly see that our attack model is therefore
trained on the output of a function Fg and deployed against
the output of a function Ft. It is understandable then that
previous work would seek to have the behavior of Fg mirror
the behavior of Ft. This assumption naturally extends to say
that Fg , in an attempt to mirror Ft, must be, or intuitively
should be, of the same model type as Ft in a successful
membership inference attack model.
However, this assumption is not necessary to launch
an effective membership inference attack. We conducted a
set of experiments varying model type combinations of Ft,
Fg , and Fa considering the four candidate model types.The
combination with the highest accuracy for each dataset is re-
ported in Table 7. Let type(Fmaxt ), type(F
max
g ), type(F
max
a )
be the target model, attack data generation model, and at-
tack model types respectively for the membership inference
attack which reported the highest accuracy. These types
will naturally vary for different datasets. We also report
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Dataset Model Types for Accuracy type(Fmaxt )
Accuracy
type(Fmaxg )
Accuracy
type(Fmaxa )
Accuracy
(Fmaxt , F
max
g , F
max
a ) (F
max
t , F
max
g , F
max
a ) All type(Fmaxt ) All type(F
max
g ) All type(Fmaxa )
Adult (DT, DT, NB) 59.91% DT 59.89% DT 59.89% NB 50.18%
MNIST (DT, DT, LR) 61.80% DT 61.75% DT 61.75% LR 54.38%
CIFAR-10 (DT, LR, NB) 90.52% DT 90.44% LR 67.40% NB 50.01%
Purchases-10 (DT, k-NN, DT) 82.45% DT 82.29% k-NN 53.78% DT 82.29%
Purchases-20 (DT, LR, NB) 89.05% DT 88.98% LR 80.50% NB 51.29%
Purchases-50 (DT, LR, LR) 93.77% DT 93.71% LR 88.60% LR 88.60%
Purchases-100 (k-NN, LR, DT) 95.86% k-NN 95.74% LR 90.23% DT 62.19%
TABLE 7
Model set up with maximum accuracy averaged across 10 runs using 10-fold cross validation. Maximum configuration is then
compared to configurations where model type is consistent across the target, generation, and attack models using each model
type represented in the maximum configuration.
accuracy for scenarios when all three model types are set
to type(Fmaxt ). We similarly report when all three types are
equivalent to type(Fmaxg ) and type(F
max
a ).
For example, we recall that in Table 3 the highest ac-
curacy was reported when the target model was a de-
cision tree, the data generation model was a logistic re-
gression model, and the attack model was a Naı¨ve Bayes
model. Therefore, type(Fmaxt ) = DT, type(F
max
g ) = LR,
and type(Fmaxa ) = NB, as shown in column 2 of Table 7
along with the attack accuracy under these settings. For the
CIFAR-10 dataset, we then also report the attack accuracy
when all the models are a decision tree (i.e. equivalent to
type(Fmaxt )), when all models are logistic regression models
(type(Fmaxg )), and finally when all models are Bayesian
(type(Fmaxa )). We repeat this process for all seven datasets.
We observe that, across datasets, it is not necessary
for all models to be of the same type, as no maximally
accurate combination contained the same model type across
all three phases of the membership attack development. Ad-
ditionally, the attack data generation model, as previously
assumed, does not need to strictly mirror the target model
for a successful membership inference attack. In fact, for 5
out of the 7 datasets the highest accuracy was reported when
the attack data generation model was of a different type than
the target model, i.e. type(Fmaxt ) 6= type(Fmaxg ). The reason
behind this non-intuitive phenomenon lies in a more precise
understanding of the role of the generation model. Although
it was previously assumed that the role was to mirror the
behavior of the target model, we assert that the generation
model’s role is to characterize how the target model may be
impacted by the inclusion of a particular instance. That is,
how the decision boundary of the target model may reveal
the inclusion of an instance.
The generation algorithm is therefore trying to character-
ize probability distributions related to a decision boundary
which either has or has not been informed by the instance.
From this perspective, it is now more clear that the vulner-
ability is more closely related to two elements: distribution
of the data and sensitivity of the decision boundary. If a de-
cision boundary for a given dataset is notably impacted by
the inclusion of a given instance then membership inference
attacks are likely to be more successful.
In summary, we have demonstrated that, despite natural
intuition, it is not strictly necessary for the attack data
generation technique to be of the same type as the target
model for a membership inference attack to be successful.
Additionally, we again see the dominating factors are the
target model type and the training dataset. We note that
when all model types are equivalent to Fmaxt the resulting
accuracy is within 0.16% of the maximum reported accuracy.
By comparison, setting all model types to Fmaxg decreases
attack accuracy by up to 28.67%. Setting all model types to
Fmaxa demonstrates an even larger decrease in many cases
as Fmaxa is reported to be a Naı¨ve Bayes model for multiple
datasets. As we previously identified the Naı¨ve Bayes model
as robust against membership inference attack, it is not
surprising that attack accuracy will decrease significantly
in these cases.
While success is close to maximal in all scenarios when
the target model type is known, we re-accentuate the attack
success seen in Table 7 with a mixture of model types. This
again supports the conclusion that an adversary need not
have this level of insider knowledge to launch a successful
attack. Rather, when a model and its training dataset are
particularly vulnerable, a variety of attack scenarios are
likely to demonstrate success.
4.6 Impact of Attacker Knowledge
Finally, we demonstrate the impact of attacker knowledge
on their ability to launch successful membership inference
attacks. We evaluate attacker knowledge along two separate
vectors: (1) accurate target data and (2) accurate shadow
data.
In Figure 7, we demonstrate the impact of attacker
knowledge of the target data points. That is, if the attacker
does not accurately know each feature within x, is the
attacker still able to identify if x ∈ D or if x /∈ D? To
simulate this uncertainty we add noise to the target data
points prior to querying. Given features normalized within
[0, 1] we add noise uniformly sampled from [0, σ]. In Figure
7, we gradually increase σ from 0 to 1, recording the impact
on the membership inference attack accuracy. We report
results from 4 datasets using logistic regression models for
target, generation, and attack models.
While it is unsurprising that the noisier the target in-
stance the less accurate the attack, it is also interesting to
note that accurate attacks may still be launched when small
amounts of noise are added. That is, if the attacker knows
90% of the data for the target instance but perhaps has to
make an educated guess for the final 10%, then that attacker
is able to identify whether or not the target instance was
within the training data with similar accuracy as was seen
when 100% of the target data was known.
We conducted similar experimentation with respect to
the shadow data. That is, we began by selecting a shadow
dataset disjoint from the target training data but from the
same distribution. We then added noise to each instance
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Fig. 7. Impact of Noisy Target Data on Attack Accuracy with Logistic
Regression models.
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Fig. 8. Impact of Noisy Shadow Data on Attack Accuracy with Linear
Regression Models.
within the shadow dataset as was done in the previous ex-
periment. Shadow models were then trained and evaluated
during the attack data generation process using this noisy
shadow dataset. Figure 8 reports the impact of σ on the re-
sulting membership inference attack accuracy. Experiments
were again run for 4 datasets with the logistic regression
model used in all phases.
We can see in Figure 8 that the attack accuracy is rel-
atively resilient to noisy shadow data. While the CIFAR-10
dataset shows a slight decline in accuracy as noise increases,
this decline is minor when compared to the inclusion of
noise into the target data. Additionally, the various Pur-
chases datasets show strong resilience to the introduction
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Fig. 9. Impact Shadow Data Size on Attack Accuracy with Logistic
Regression models.
of noise into the shadow dataset. When comparing Figures
7 and 8 it is clear that the attacker is more likely to be
successful if resources are allocated to developing strong,
accurate target instances compared to perfectly representa-
tive shadow data.
Finally, in Figure 9 we report the effect that the size
of the shadow dataset has on attack accuracy. For these
experiments we select shadow datasets of various sizes
which are again disjoint from the target training data but
from the same distribution. No noise is added for these
experiments to isolate the impact of the shadow data size.
The experiments are evaluated on the same four datasets
again with logistic regression models.
Each dataset in these experiments appears to result in
different behavior. The CIFAR-10 dataset continues to show
increased accuracy as the shadow dataset size increases. The
Purchases-10 dataset however shows an initial accuracy in-
crease before decreasing again and leveling out by the time
the shadow dataset reaches 1,000 instances. The Purchases-
20 dataset shows a fast initial trend of accuracy improve-
ment before leveling off at a shadow dataset size around
700 instances. Finally, the Purchases-50 dataset results show
a similar trend to that seen with the CIFAR-10 dataset where
the accuracy continues to increase with the shadow dataset
size.
Overall through Figures 7, 8, and 9 it is clear that
accuracy in the target instances is the most important
attacker knowledge factor in determining attack success.
With limited resources an attacker should therefore focus
on acquiring sufficient information with respect to target
instances. The next most deterministic element is the size
of the shadow dataset. Rather than allocating resources to
ensuring completely accurate instances, attackers should
instead put the focus on quantity in the development of
their shadow datasets.
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4.7 Federated Learning and Insider Attacks
4.7.1 Insider Attack Model
To this point we have exclusively discussed “outsider”
membership inference attacks. That is, membership infer-
ence attacks which are launched by an adversary who is
only a user of the target model through black-box access
to the target service prediction API. We now introduce the
threat of insider membership inference attacks. We define
these attacks to be those launched by a participant in a
federated learning system.
In recent years there has been an increased interest in
the role of federated learning systems in addressing privacy
concerns in data mining. The intuition behind federated sys-
tems to protect against membership inference is as follows:
if an adversary is able to identify that a certain instance
is contained within the training data of a model and that
model is the result of a federated learning system, then
any individual participant will have plausible deniability
with respect to their individual dataset. However, such
federations open the door to a new risk through insider
attacks.
The difference between an attack on federated sys-
tems and outsider membership inference attacks is that,
in federated systems, the training dataset D is divided
amongst multiple parties who engage in collaborative learn-
ing to provide predictions to the machine learning ser-
vice. We consider the following loosely federated system:
given parties P1, P2, ..., P` there exist ` independent dataset
D1, D2, ..., D`, one belonging to each party. Each party Pi
will then train a model Fti using Di as the corresponding
training data.
Within this environment, new instances will be evalu-
ated as follows. On input of x, each model Fti will output
a probability vector pi = Fti(x). The individual parties will
then share their output either openly with one another or
with some aggregation service to compute the final output
p = ave(p1,p2, ...,p`) where ave refers to point-wise
averaging of the probability vectors. Any outside adversary
using this service will only have access to the final proba-
bility vector p. Any individual party Pi will therefore have
plausible deniability because, if an instance is identified as
a member of the training data, the adversary is unlikely to
identify which training set specifically.
However we must also consider adversaries who are
members of the federated learning systems. That is, the
aggregation service or a participating party. Under this
scenario the “insider” will have access to the individual
probability vectors p1,p2, ...,p`. The insider membership
inference attack then becomes: given these probability vec-
tors, is the adversary able to identify which dataset a train-
ing instance belongs to.
We now consider when parties may participate in a fed-
erated system. Let P1, P2, and P3 represent three candidate
parties with training datasets D1, D2, and D3 respectively.
Let us assume the extreme case that D1, D2, and D3 are
statistically equivalent. Then, the trained models Ft1 , Ft2 ,
and Ft3 will approximate the same ideal function Γ. Given
this set up, it is then likely that, on any input x, the
outputs Ft1(x), Ft2(x), and Ft3(x) will also be statistically
equivalent. Here, there is no accuracy gain for P1, P2, or
P3 through collaboration. They are therefore unlikely to be
motivated to create a federated learning system.
Alternatively, consider such significantly different D1,
D2, and D3 such that Ft1 , Ft2 , and Ft3 may be considered
independent. Let us now assume accuracies of 75%, 80%,
and 70% and a majority voting aggregation scheme. Such
a federation, on input x, has an 84.5% chance of accurately
classifying x, an accuracy higher than any individual model.
Under these conditions, P1, P2, and P3 are much more likely
to form a federation.
It is therefore reasonable to assume parties are likely
to form federated learning systems when their individual
datasets are sufficiently different. Unfortunately, this leads
to sufficiently different decision boundaries for different
parties. These diverging decision boundaries open the door
to effective insider membership inference attacks as an
adversary will notice differences in p1, p2, ..., p`.
4.7.2 Insider Attack Risk in Federated Systems
In Table 8 we see that even datasets showing resilience to
outsider membership inference are vulnerable to an insider
membership inference attack. We created a federated system
where n = 3 for datasets with k ≤ 10 so that each party
has sufficient instances of each class to learn a meaningful
decision boundary. Given a federation where n = 3, any
party behaving as an adversary will have an attack precision
baseline of 50%. This allows for comparison with the out-
sider inference attacks. Both the Adult and MNIST dataset
showed minimal vulnerability in the outsider membership
inference attacks and experienced significant jumps in vul-
nerability in the insider attack scenario while the CIFAR-10
and Purchases-10 datasets show similar precision results,
notably outperforming the baseline.
Dataset Outsider Inference Insider InferencePrecision (Accuracy) Precision (Accuracy)
Adult 55.49 (59.89) 73.26 (69.33)
MNIST 56.66 (61.75) 68.47 (68.17)
CIFAR-10 83.94 (90.44) 82.02 (82.05)
Purchases-10 73.85 (82.29) 74.42 (74.30)
TABLE 8
Insider inference precision in federated systems with 3 parties.
Baseline is 50%. Model type is set to decision tree.
In Figure 10, we plot the decision boundaries created
by three different decision tree models trained on disjoint
subsets of the Adult dataset to articulate how the variation
in decision boundaries informs insider attacks. We plot the
decision boundaries relative to the capital loss and education
number features. The section enclosed within the blue box
highlights a portion of the decision boundary which notably
differs between each plot. The second level of Figure 10
is a zoomed-in view of this section for all three plots. On
the third level we then plot the positive training instances
that informed each decision boundary in this region. It is
clear that the long region identified as the positive class in
the third plot was informed by significantly more positive
instances than the other two decision plots. It is decision
boundary differences such as those demonstrated here, and
what they reveal of the underlying training data, that re-
veals ownership in the insider membership inference attack.
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More specifically, we know that a participant who re-
turns prediction vectors consistent with the third plot (i.e.
higher probabilities for the positive class within the long
horizontal region), is more likely to have seen a participant
with a capital loss value just under 2,000 and a salary above
$50,000. The probabilities returned from the participant with
a model whose decision boundary is more consistent with
the first plot however will return higher probabilities for
the negative class. It is therefore much less likely that this
participant has an individual with a capital loss value within
this range and a salary greater than $50,000. An attacker,
therefore, will know that such an individual (i.e. one who
falls within this range with a higher salary) is much more
likely to be in the dataset of the third participant.
This is supported by the accuracy seen for federations
with different data distributions characteristics. When con-
structing our federated learning systems for these experi-
ments we first sampled target class distributions at random
to create different scenarios which may be seen in deployed
federated learning environments.
In Figure 11 we show the relationship between the
accuracy of the insider membership inference attack and
the distance between the two targeted parties’ data. That
is, let a 3-party federation be formed by parties P1, P2, and
P3 wherein P3 behaves maliciously and launches an insider
membership inference attack against P1 and P2. Then, we
look at how similar all the instances of class ki in D1 are
to those of class ki in D2. This similarity is averaged across
all ki ∈ [1, k]. If the datasets are more similar then their in-
class distance will be lower. In Figure 11 we can see that P3
will be less successful than when D1 and D2 have a closer
in-class measure than if the datasets are very different.
Unfortunately this leads to a catch-22 scenario. Parties
with very similar looking training datasets will not be
motivated to participate in a federation as they are less likely
to see significant increases in classification accuracy. Parties
with very different looking training datasets, however, will
be more vulnerable to insider membership inference.
We argue that the risk of insider membership inference
attack is of particular concern as participants are likely to
assume they are less vulnerable than in outsider scenarios
due to the plausible deniability protections inherent in fed-
erated learning systems. The potential for insider attacks,
however, calls for a robust trust policy for any federated
learning system to consider such risk.
5 MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
We categorize mitigation techniques to protect against mem-
bership inference into two categories: model hardening and
API hardening.
Model Hardening. Model hardening mitigation tech-
niques are implemented during the training phase of the
target model Ft. We suggest four such techniques: (1)
model choice, (2) fit control, (3) regularization, and (4)
anonymization. In model choice, a service provider may in-
troduce concerns of membership inference into their model
selection process. For example, as was demonstrated in
our experimentation, a Naı¨ve Bayes target model will be
much more resilient to membership inference attacks than a
decision tree and therefore may be the preferred model type
for a particular machine learning service. For fit control,
service providers may leverage parameters such as the
decision tree’s complexity parameter for tree pruning to
prevent overfitting and therefore decrease inference risk.
Another technique is regularization where noise is added
to a model’s loss function. This technique is particularly rel-
evant to deep learning models. Finally, the service provider
may introduce anonymization techniques into D prior to
training. That is, if D is made to be k-anonymous prior to
the training of Ft then the impact of a single instance may
be hid amongst k others prior to training.
API Hardening. API hardening techniques are imple-
mented during the prediction phase through the machine
learning service. For example, the service API may intro-
duce noise into the prediction vector before returning it to
the user. This will reduce the adversary’s understanding
of exactly where an instance lies with respect to the target
model’s decision boundary. Another option is to reduce the
dimensionality of p. This can be done either by limiting the
return value to the top k′ < k values in p or even return-
ing only the prediction label. Machine learning-as-a-service
APIs may additionally be hardened through limiting queries
and/or allocating a differential privacy budget to query
responses [43]. This however requires service providers to
track and control user queries which may not always be a
suitable option.
Mitigation Parameter Model Accuracy Attack Accuracy Utility ∆
None 55% 83%
Dimension
Reduction [7]
k′ = 3 55% 83% H
k′ = 1 55% 82% H
k′ =label 55% 73% H
Regularization [7]
L2 λ = 1e− 4 56% 80% N 1%
L2 λ = 5e− 4 57% 73% N 2%
L2 λ = 1e− 3 56% 66% N 2%
L2 λ = 5e− 3 35% 52% H 20%
Adversarial
Regularization [44]
0 51.9% 63% H 3.1%
2 47.5% 51% H 7.5%
TABLE 9
Results of mitigation techniques using dataset of Texas hospital
admissions which contains 100 classes. A neural network
target model is used.
An issue that is pervasive in each mitigation technique
is a loss of utility. This is demonstrated in Table 9. We note
here that there is not significant reduction in attack accuracy
until only the label is returned when using a dimension
reduction technique. Consider a hospital processing images
of mass scans for cancer classification. A service which
says “This mass is cancerous.” is significantly less useful
than a service which says “There is a 56% chance that this
mass is cancerous.” Additionally, even with the strongest
dimension reduction, the attack accuracy is still notably
outperforming the baseline at 73%. Regularization on the
other hand is able to successfully decrease attack accuracy
to 52%. Unfortunately, to gain this level of protection the
noise introduced to the model decreases model accuracy
to 35%. This is a significant challenge in the mitigation of
membership inference attacks.
Recent work in [44] has proposed a regularization tech-
nique specifically targeting membership inference attacks.
While this approach is able to decrease attack accuracy
to 51% with a comparatively moderate decrease in test
accuracy to 47.5%, the training accuracy drops from 81.6%
to 55%. It is therefore unclear to what degree regularization
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Fig. 10. Decision boundaries for 3 different participants in a federated system using the Adult dataset. An area where the decision
boundaries are significantly different is highlighted as well as the training instances provided to each participant relevant to the
highlighted area.
Fig. 11. In-class distance between different parties compared
with insider attack accuracy for the Adult dataset with a 3-party
federated learning system.
mitigation is simply a decrease in learning. If the model
learns less from the training data in the first place it will
naturally have less to reveal when under attack.
Differential Privacy. The definition of membership in-
ference leads to a natural assumption that a solution lies
with differential privacy. There are, however, remaining
questions on the exact relationship between differential
privacy and membership inference attacks as the former is
a theoretical framework whereas the latter is an attack with
empirical results. Further investigation into this relationship
is crucial in understanding what attackers are truly learn-
ing in a membership inference attack and to what degree
differential privacy curtails attackers’ ability to learn this
information.
For example, Figure 7 shows that even if an instance
which is relatively close to the target instance is provided,
the membership inference attack can still be successful.
Therefore, is the attacker learning that x is in D, is the
attacker learning that something similar to x is in D, or is the
attacker simply learning that x is consistent with a decision
boundary informed by D?
Additionally, if differential privacy is the answer to
mitigating membership inference vulnerability, what level
of privacy (value of ) is sufficient to provide protection? For
example, the authors in [45] launch membership inference
attacks against deep learning models trained with differ-
entially private mechanisms. While a privacy parameter
of  = 1 is able to protect against membership infer-
ence, dropping attack accuracy to 50.8% with the CIFAR-
10 dataset, the training accuracy also drops from 94.4% in
the non-private case to 24.7%. Even with a modest privacy
parameter of  = 8 the authors report an attack accuracy
58.3% with a training accuracy of just 68.6%. The authors
in [46] also remark that defense mechanisms based on dif-
ferential privacy are not always effective, particularly when
an attacker is able to mimic the behavior of the perturbation.
Further research is necessary to understand which differ-
ential privacy mechanisms under what settings are able to
provide viable protection to membership inference without
forfeiting model utility.
6 RELATED WORK
Membership inference is a young area, but there still exist
a few works since [7] investigating the risk of membership
inference attacks. Most of the existing proposals focus on
deep learning models and are influenced by adversarial
deep learning research such as [47], [48], [49]. For exam-
ple, [8] identifies vulnerable instances for membership in-
ference attacks exclusively relating to deep learning models
while [10] seeks to define a measure of deep learning
model vulnerability, with respect to the model’s encoding
of a random secret within the training data, orthogonal to
membership inference. [9] studies membership inference in
generative adversarial networks (GANs), and shows that
the level of generalization required to mitigate against mem-
bership inference in GANs will lead to worse results in
accuracy and utility. This serves as independent evidence
for the mitigation strategies and research direction we pro-
mote, which include methods for anonymizing the training
datasets while preserving the model training quality.
[42] proposed a measure of risk at the data in-
stance level, and evaluated the measure on the Adult and
Purchases-10 datasets with attack model, target model, and
shadow model of the same type. The identified instance-
level risks exemplify our analysis that membership infer-
ence attacks are data-driven.
Alternative study on membership inference relates to the
impact of overfitting based on the belief that the cause of
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membership inference is model overfitting. [50] investigates
this belief and concludes that overfitting is not necessary
for a model to show vulnerability to membership inference.
Their investigation is limited to the role of overfitting and
assumes a powerful adversary with prior knowledge of the
average training loss for Ft. This work does motivate that
membership inference vulnerability is more complex than
just the overfitting in the training data.
Application-specific membership inference, such as [46],
studied membership inference vulnerability specific to lo-
cation data under a powerful adversary with deep prior
knowledge. Though this work aims at attacking aggregate
data rather than a trained target model and its training
data, it does demonstrate the risk of membership inference
attacks in a privacy-conscious domain.
Our work is mainly inspired by [7], the first exploratory
work in membership inference, which shows membership
inference risks for a deep learning trained target models.
In this paper we extend the work done in [7] to a more
general setting towards demystifying the adverse effect
of membership inference across different types of models
with both general and empirical characterization of why
membership inference attacks are more effective in some
scenarios than in others.
7 CONCLUSION
We have presented the first generalized framework for the
development of a membership inference attack model. This
general formulation enables an in-depth characterization
of membership infernece attacks against different types of
machine learning models. Through extensive experimen-
tation and empirical evidence, we show when and why
machine learning models may be vulnerable to membership
inference attacks. By exploring a variety of machine learning
model types and their correlations with respect to the three
phases of the attack generation process, we present five
interesting characteristics of membership inference attacks:
(1) they are data-driven attacks, (2) attack models are trans-
ferable, (3) target model type is a strong indicator of model
vulnerability, (4) attack data generation techniques need
not explicitly mirror the target model, and (5) membership
inference attacks can persist as insider attacks in federated
systems. We also include a discussion on countermeasures
and mitigation methods against membership inference at-
tacks.
Our research on membership inference attacks and mem-
bership privacy continues along several dimensions. First,
we are engaged in the development of countermeasures
and defense methods. Second, we are currently studying
the scale and diversity of membership inference attacks in
federated and collaborative learning systems. Third, we are
investigating the complex relationships between member-
ship inference attacks, membership privacy, and differential
privacy.
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